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Abstract—We present a novel blockchain based service for proving the provenance of online digital identity, exposed as an assistive
tool to help non-expert users make better decisions about whom to trust online. Our service harnesses the digital personhood (DP); the
longitudinal and multi-modal signals created through users’ lifelong digital interactions, as a basis for evidencing the provenance of
identity. We describe how users may exchange trust evidence derived from their DP, in a granular and privacy-preserving manner, with
other users in order to demonstrate coherence and longevity in their behaviour online. This is enabled through a novel secure
infrastructure combining hybrid on- and off-chain storage combined with deep learning for DP analytics and visualization. We show
how our tools enable users to make more effective decisions on whether to trust unknown third parties online, and also to spot
behavioural deviations in their own social media footprints indicative of account hijacking.
Index Terms—Distributed Ledger Technology, Identity, Online Trust, Artificial Intelligence, Interaction Design.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
ONLINE fraud and scams are sharply on the increase,costing the global economy in excess of US$3 trillion in
2018 [65] and are often perpetrated through ephemeral false
identities. Users struggle to make decisions on who to trust
online, exposing themselves to risks from inappropriate
over-disclosure of personal data. This motivates new tech-
niques for determining the provenance and trustworthiness
of the digital identities — people, business or services —
encountered online.
This paper reports a novel blockchain-based service that
harnesses the complex longitudinal and multi-modal signals
within citizens’ digitally mediated interactions (for example,
on social media) to support safe online interactions. These
signals created - photos shared, comments left, posts ‘liked’
etc. - weave a complex ‘tapestry’ reflecting our relationships,
personality and identity, referred to as the ‘Digital Person-
hood’ (DP). Commodification of the DP now fuels a billion-
dollar industry in which machine learning is increasingly
utilised to help make sense of, and extract value from, the
deluge of DP data. In this work we exploit the DP for
the social good; through a platform (herein referred to as
’TAPESTRY’) that empowers users to share ‘trust evidence’
of their DP in a granular, privacy preserving manner, in
order to prove the provenance of their digital identity and
so engender trust online.
We draw distinction between the problem of proving
identity (authentication), and the problem tackled here, of
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proving the provenance of a digital identity. Online security
is typically reliant on traditional representations of identity,
taking simple pseudonyms or email addresses at face value
to interact with one another or digital services. We are now
entering a new era in which citizens will construct a DP
from childhood, comprising rich lifelong digital trails from
social media and interactions with technology [40]. Those
accumulated signals offer an increasingly viable way to
prove the veracity of a digital identity. Leveraging the DP
for this purpose poses significant challenges around signal
processing, privacy, information security and infrastructure.
Further challenges arise by designing the service for non-
experts, who may have low levels of digital literacy -
especially around numeracy. A fundamental tenet of the
TAPESTRY platform is the preservation of the end-user as
the owner of trust decisions; we do not wish to develop
a ‘trust traffic light’ or trust scoring system. Rather we
wish to summarise in an intuitive way the trust evidence
disclosed from one user to another, in order to support
strong decision making around trust using that evidence.
TAPESTRY tackles these challenges through three novel
technical contributions:
1) A secure data architecture combining off-chain
storage of encrypted trust evidence derived from
the DP, backed by an unpermissioned proof-of-
work (PoW) blockchain to ensure the integrity and
provenance of that evidence. The architecture incor-
porates a symmetric key sharing scheme, enabling
granular disclosure of trust evidence. This provides
users with agency over to whom evidence is dis-
closed, as well as control over the time periods and
kinds of DP activity disclosed. (Secs. 3, 5).
2) A machine learning (ML) algorithm to irreversibly
gist DP activity into compact descriptors that serve
as the basic unit of trust evidence for sharing in
the platform. We propose a deep neural network
(DNN) to extract this evidence through a combi-
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nation of semantic embedding and temporal mod-
elling, enabling behavioural deviation to be detected
over time. This in turn enables quantification of the
regularity and temporal coherence of trust evidence
which, combined with assurances over provenance
and integrity from the blockchain, serves as the
basis for users to make better trust decisions (Sec. 4).
3) A data visualisation technique for representing the
regularity and coherence of the trust evidence dis-
closed by a user within a single static image. The
design of the visualisation is evaluated and shown
to enable non-expert users to quickly make accurate
determinations of the trustworthiness of a digital
identity previously unknown to them (Sec. 6).
In order to evaluate our technical prototype of the
TAPESTRY service, we explore two user-centric case studies
where valid trust judgements and the avoidance of either
fraud or victimisation are desirable for users.
First, we explore the efficacy of TAPESTRY to help users
to detect fraudulent profiles in the context of crowdfunding
within the video games industry. Crowdfunding is a com-
mon vehicle by which small studios obtain financial support
for new projects, and an online interaction in which in-
vestors consider the trustworthiness of pitchers as a primary
factor in investment. We developed a controlled, workshop
based evaluation of TAPESTRY in which the platform was
used as an aid to investment decision making within a
mocked-up crowdfunding scenario. In this scenario, we
used TAPESTRY to visualize trust evidence derived from
real-world social media footprints of games developers, and
artificial profiles fabricated and curated in months prior to
the study. We show that whilst TAPESTRY users do not
make materially different trust decisions in terms of their
accuracy (distinguishing the provenance of fake versus real
identities), they are able to do so significantly more quickly
using TAPESTRY leading to advantages when making de-
cisions online in time pressured information overloaded
situations.
Second, we explore the efficiency of TAPESTRY to help
users detect unusual patterns of behaviour within their
own social media profile pointing to unauthorized use (or
account ’hijacking’). Again our goal is not to automatically
raise an alarm or classify this behaviour, but to visually
gist the trust evidence derived from a social media profile.
When accustomed to the visual ’look and feel’ of TAPESTRY
visualisations of this trust evidence, we show that users
can perceive deviations from the norm and so spot unusual
patterns in online activities posted under their profile.
2 RELATED WORK
Open authentication models (e.g. OAuth2) exist for estab-
lishing cross-site login without credential sharing, relying
upon a trusted identity provider (e.g. Google, Facebook)
to approve access to a digital identity. In addition, there
is a range of services which help to establish trust, for
both named and anonymous/pseudonymous users. For
example, Escrow is a contractual arrangement used within
the Dark Web, facilitated via a third party, which engen-
ders trust between buyer and seller for crypto-currency
transactions [51]. However, TAPESTRY is not proposing yet
another access control solution or service for hosting digital
identities or the DP, or for facilitating trusted transactions.
Rather, TAPESTRY proposes an entirely new kind of service
through which one may verify the trustworthiness of a dig-
ital identity through evidence derived from signals within
an identity’s DP.
2.1 Signals for Online Trust
The nature of trust is complex. It is ’...a psychological state
comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon
positive expectations of the intentions or behaviours of
another’ [16]. Importantly, this definition positions risk as
naturally co-existing with trust: an individual accepts that
the other party in an interaction may or may not act in the
expected manner, but believes that their intentions are good.
Offline, judgments about trust are informed by routinely
available emotional and behavioural cues [10], [31], [59].
Online, these cues are usually absent. However, recent work
indicates that there are alternate factors that may inform
trust judgments [37].
In the context of our crowdfunding case study of
TAPESTRY (c.f. Sec.7.2), prior work indicates that these
factors include (i) herding, where (e.g.) potential investors
are reassured by the behaviour of previous investors, on
the assumption that if others are doing something, it must
be the rational thing to do [11], [43] and (ii) social proof,
where (e.g.) less-expert investors are encouraged to invest
later in a campaign by the involvement of early investors
who are experts in product development or financial in-
vestment [39]. A further factor is social engagement. For
example, trust is generated when creators of a crowdfund-
ing campaign provide investors with updates on positive
progress towards published goals. This reassures investors
and indicative of trust - increases their investment [35],
[43]. Trust is also generated when creators link their social
media accounts [62]: investors likely feel that the creator
has nothing to hide. Although such observations exist in
the literature, TAPESTRY is unique in aggregating evidence
from such sources to aid the user in their decision making
on trust.
2.2 Social Media Analytics for Trust
Use of online services now pervades society and automated
profiling of the digital footprint is increasingly used for
identity verification online [66]. Digital Personhood-related
research increasingly involves exploring the behaviours and
activities of an online user through the large volumes of
data a user generates through e. g. social media posts and
search histories that collectively comprise their digital foot-
print [41]. Such footprints play a crucial role across many
digital economy services including user profiling [24], per-
sonality [44] and crowdfunding [52]. Therefore, it’s vitally
important to protect DP by early detecting any malicious
activities in social media feeds to prevent economic or
reputational loss. There exists various research methods in
social media analytics for trust. Chalapathy et al. [9] and
Yu et al. [69] explore abnormal behaviours detection from
regular group patterns, while Kang et al. [38] use rela-
tionship graph to model social network activities to detect
anomalous events. In [1], the authors use social graph and
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text information to detect fraudulent comments in online
review systems. Phua et al. [55] focus on structural metadata
within the social activities instead of content. However,
modeling users’ behavioural norms in social media over
longitudinal time periods, as well as visually representing
this analysis to end-users, remains an open challenge that
our research aims to address.
2.3 Trust and Identity over Blockchain
Blockchain’s innovation is in its facilitation of direct trans-
fer of unique digital property (e.g. currency, data, certifi-
cates) - previously reliant on third party intermediaries [2],
[22]. This promotes trustless trust [2] whereby exchanges
are ‘unidirectionally’ trustworthy and interpersonal trust,
or trust in another online agent is replaced through the
technology’s functionality of transparency, codification and
immutability as a cryptographic audit trail [22]. However,
while Blockchain brings significant trust-related functional-
ity for end users many questions remain, both about how
to demonstrate and prove such trust to an end user, and if -
and if so how - a blockchain service enables this over exist-
ing intermediaries. Elsden et al. [22] catalogued over 200
blockchain applications and found that amongst identity
management systems, most digital identities were provided
by a third party (e.g Facebook or email account) or required
supplementary state-backed documentation (passport, so-
cial security numbers etc.) to prove an identity. Amongst
self-sovereign digital identity Blockchain services, where
an individual issues and controls their own identity, many
involved biometrics (e.g. fingerprint or iris scan) supported
by other personal information (email address, bank details
etc.). Dunphy and Petitcolas’s in-depth review of identity
management models using DLT [21] also found a prevalence
of reliance on intermediaries, with the authors additionally
summarising current UK and EU regulatory challenges i. e.
‘know your customer’; anti-money laundering; and data
protection. There are additional challenges of not only
supporting the demonstration of the technology’s unique
trust-supporting benefits but of communicating DP data
in a visual form that supports intelligibility amongst non-
expert users. TAPESTRY addresses this challenge through
designing visualisations of trust evidence collected from
social media, that communicate the coherence (and by
extension, provenance) of the digital personhood without
disclosing specifics about a subject’s past activities. Re-
lated to TAPESTRY’s ability to evidence social media ac-
tivity in privacy preserving manner are distributed privacy-
preserving social networks, such as Safebook [13] and early
attempts to realize the functionalities of a social network
using cryptographic techniques [4], [30]. The focus of these
approaches have been on the privacy of the users and
allowing them full control over their data. Thus, they allow
the user to alter their data after previously committing to
it. By contrast, TAPESTRY provides an immutable record
of past social media activity that a user may share to
evidence the provenance of their digital identity. The use
of Blockchain to provide such a service – analogous to a
de-centralised credit reference for identity – is unique to
TAPESTRY and addresses emerging concerns among the
general public around the risks to privacy and security of
siloing data within centralised services or organisations.
Fig. 1. TAPESTRY System architecture. Data is collected on subjects via
the blue path. Digital activities (such as social media interactions) are
captured on opt-in basis via a web browser extension. Trust evidence
is derived from those activities via a deep neural network (DNN) and
encrypted using a secret key. Keys differ between activities and change
over time. Encrypted evidence is stored within a data lake, alongside
metadata identifying the owner, timestamp and type of activity. A hash
of that metadata serves as a unique ID to that evidence. The encrypted
evidence is hashed alongside its unique ID within a proof-of-work
blockchain. The green path enables a verifier to check the provenance
of a subject by requesting disclosure of the relevant decryption keys.
Encrypted evidence is requested from the lake; the provenance of that
evidence is checked via the blockchain and it is decrypted. Analysis
of the DNN signals yields a visualisation gisting the relevant period of
activity that helps the user make a trust decision on the subject.
3 OVERVIEW OF THE TAPESTRY SERVICE
The TAPESTRY service collects, on an opt-in basis, signals
derived from the digital activities of a user (the ’subject’)
and enables that subject to securely share those signals
with another user (the ‘verifier’) in order to demonstrate
their provenance of that subject’s identity. We assume that
these signals or ‘trust evidence’ (TE) are collected over
longitudinal time periods from a rich tapestry of activities
such as social media posts on various social platforms.
In a typical interaction, the verifier will determine what
kinds of TE are sufficient to make a human decision on
the trustworthiness of a user according to their use context.
For example, on an online dating forum, or a ride-sharing
service, a verifier might request evidence of a year of posting
activity on any of several social media platforms in order
to make their trust decision. It is a matter for the subject
to decide whether to disclose the requested evidence, and
indeed the act of declining creates in itself a basis for the
verifying party to make a trust decision.
3.1 Privacy Attributes
In order to provide privacy to TAPESTRY users, TE is
derived through a one-way hashing function that creates
a compact, privacy-preserving gist of the semantic con-
tent of an activity (for example the text or image posted).
TAPESTRY utilises a deep neural network (DNN) to per-
form this distillation in order to prevent content from being
recovered from TE, yet enabling two pieces of TE to be
compared to quantify the similarity of the content that
generated it. The details of this process are described further
within Sec. 4. Thus a subject may share evidence of an
activity, such as a social media post, without providing the
content of that post to the verifier. Furthermore, TE is stored
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within the platform in an encrypted form using a secret
key held by the subject. A different key is used for each
TE generated from each type of activity (Facebook photo
post, Twitter text post) and is changed periodically. When
a subject agrees to disclose TE to a verifier they do so by
sharing the relevant keys. Key generation and sharing, as
well as the broader encryption scheme within TAPESTRY, is
discussed in Sec. 5.
Since the volume of TE (e. g. spanning months or years)
requested of a subject is typically large, TAPESTRY creates
a visual gist (’visualisation’) of the TE in order to make it
intuitively comprehensible to the verifier. The design of the
visualisation is discussed in Sec. 6. The core information
communicated via the visualisation is the coherence of the
user’s digital history, derived from the timestamps and
similarities of the TE shared by the subject. Having sight of
this visualisation the verifier finally makes a human decision
as to whether the user is trustworthy, in combination with
other external factors such as social norms prevailing in
their use context. At no point is an automated decision
offered to the verifier as to the trustworthiness of the user,
and at no point is the subject’s decision to share TE made
automatically. Rather, TAPESTRY acts as a privacy preserv-
ing conduit for the request and supply of TE.
3.2 De-centralised Trust Model
TAPESTRY is designed around a decentralised trust model,
without reliance upon third-parties to vouch for the in-
tegrity and provenance of TE. This trust model is facilitated
via a proof-of-work (PoW) Blockchain.
Recent changes in legislation (GDPR [23]) mean that
users have the right to request that their personal data
be deleted from any systems controlled by third-parties.
In the case of TAPESTRY this meant that raw data from
user activities could not be stored on-chain, as this could
not be later removed. Storing only the encrypted vectors
from the machine learning models, would also not comply
due to the nature of the computations involved, which
create an alternative digital representation of the user’s
behavior, thus personally identifiable information. Storing
the personally identifiable information off-chain, within one
or more independent data lakes (DLs), provides a method of
data capture that facilitates recovering data for verification
purposes, and can be deleted at the user’s request.
TAPESTRY therefore uses a hybrid system of on- and off-
chain storage for TE; see Fig. 1. A cloud service (of which
many independently operated services are assumed to exist)
maintains the DL into which the subject commits encrypted
TE alongside plaintext metadata that identifies the user
uniquely, as well as the timestamp and type of activity. A
SHA-256 hash of the encrypted TE is stored within a proof-
of-work (PoW) Blockchain, keyed by a hash of the metadata
(computed also via SHA-256) which serves as a unique
identifier to the TE record in the DL. In practice, a block
committed to the PoW chain contains many such pairs.
Fig. 2 summarises the interactions between the subject, the
DL and the Blockchain during collection of TE.
On-chain hashing enables the verifier to check the prove-
nance of TE, prior to decrypting and visualizing that ev-
idence for human judgement. The hash of the encrypted
Subject Data Lake DLT
Receive
user activity
Calculate
vector
Encrypt and
sign vector
Submit data
Submit
smart
contract
transaction
Transaction
stored in
new block
Transaction hash
Fig. 2. Sequence diagram of the collection of trust evidence (TE) from a
subject. TE is generated locally, in the form of a vector distilled from raw
content via a deep neural network (DNN). The vector is encrypted, then
sent to the data lake (DL) which stores the encrypted TE off-chain and
records a hash of it within a new block in the PoW Blockchain (DLT).
evidence received is compared to that stored immutably
within the Blockchain. This guards against an attack via
fabrication of TE by the DL provider. The PoW Blockchain
is implemented via Ethereum, and a smart contract to fetch
(i. e. search and retrieve) and to commit (append) data to
the Blockchain is provided. Failure to verify the provenance
of the data, or to decrypt to the data into a parseable form
(e. g. due to an invalid secret key supplied by the subject)
results in an immediate rejection of the TE and strongly
implies an untrustworthy interaction. Fig. 3 summarises the
interactions between the verifier, subject, DL (one pictured)
and the public Blockchain during sharing and verification
of TE.
Given the complex security model employed to ensure
secure data transmission and storage, it is plausible that
user error could cause the loss of the keys, rendering their
TAPESTRY data inaccessible. Users could wish to share
their keys with a trusted third party key store, which could
provide their keys when required or even act as a facilitator
during the verification process. This optional step is analo-
gous to sharing the private keys of cryptocurrency wallets
with a centralised brokering service.
4 EXTRACTING TRUST EVIDENCE
We now describe the process through which activity content
is hashed into trust evidence (TE). Our approach is based on
the hypothesis that people have consistent (or slowly evolv-
ing) behavior and personal interests over longitudinal time
periods [63], [64]. Deviations from this organic behavior
pattern indicate either a non-natural (fake) account e. g. as a
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Subject Verifier Data Lake DLT
Share keys
for date
range
Request activities
Return n activities
Validate
signatures
Calculate
SHA256
hashes
Request hash for activity
Return hash
Compare
hashes
Decrypt
vectors
Produce
visualisation
loop n
times
Fig. 3. Sequence diagram of the process by which a verifier determines
the trustworthiness of a subject. The subject shares relevant secret keys
with the verifier, enabling encrypted TE vectors to be retrieved from the
data lake, verified for provenance against the Blockchain (DLT), and
decrypted. The vectors are converted into a visualisation to aid the
verifier’s trust decision.
vehicle for spam or online scam, or a legitimate account that
has been hijacked for similar purpose resulting in abnormal
characteristics in the timeline.
Therefore, we tackle this deviation detection problem
from behavioral norm as an outlier/anomaly detection task.
Our goal is therefore to reduce the content of a post to
a compact, real-valued vector (the TE) such that similar
semantic content maps to similar TE. In this work, we
present our deep neural network (DNN) based method to
detect coherent/incoherent activities on the Twitter social
media platform via analysis of text within a subject’s posts.
Through a combination of semantic embedding and tempo-
ral modelling, we map activity content to TE and leverage
the temporal coherence of TE to help prove the provenance
of a digital identity.
4.1 Data pre-processing
User-generated content (UGC) on social media is often a
mixture of texts, special characters, hashtags, emojis and
links. This kind of raw data is not directly suitable for
machine learning method. In natural language processing,
a pre-processing step is necessary to clean the data to nor-
malize it for the learning process. In this paper, we consider
only meaningful texts and focus on topic analysis. We first
remove special characters and retain only texts in a tweet.
We then apply successive operations, including tokenisa-
tion, stop words removal and stemming, and lemmatisation.
4.2 Topic Word Modeling
A word embedding is a distributed representation of words,
incorporating semantic information [49] that is learned from
a large corpus of text (all tweets in the collected data set
in our case). Topical modeling [6] extracts a distribution of
words as topics, and a distribution of topics as documents.
We implemented topic word embeddings, as proposed in
[47], to capture contextual information in the given docu-
ment. A topic word embedding is considered as a word-
topic pair < wi, ti >. We considered all the tweets from
one user as a document. The learned feature can enhance
discrimination between words in different contexts and
styles. A tweet embedding is the average of all topic word
embeddings derived from the words in the tweet.
4.3 Temporal Coherence via Long-Short Term Memory
The application of Deep Learning [28] is proving highly
effective in making sense of signals in computer vision [42],
natural language [25] and robotics [50]. We apply a DNN to
learn features for each user in a temporal window, denoted
as user embedding. The user embedding is regarded as a
temporal pattern of tweets in a fixed time window.
The Long-Short Term Memory (LSTM) model [33] is
a recurrent neural network used to model and predict
time-series data. We built a sequence model to capture
the coherence activities using a LSTM model and trained
to extract the user’s behavior norm based on their ‘daily
story’, e.g. as played out on social media or through other
online activity. We implemented a bi-directional LSTM to
model the temporal coherence on a daily and weekly basis
across the captured Twitter data (temporal segment). We
adopted a two-layer bidirectional LSTM, followed by two
fully connected layers. The input of LSTM is the topic word
embedding and the output is a daily or weekly tweets
embedding.
4.4 Triplet network for TE Embedding
In order to compare TE from activities over time, it is
necessary to learn a metric embedding in which norms
may be computed to quantify deviations in the topic word
embedding over time.
Triplet DNNs have been used more broadly to learn such
embeddings for information retrieval e. g. for visual search
[29], [58] and we similarly perform supervised learning of
the TE embedding using a triplet network strategy [61]. The
objective of this network structure is to map TE within the
topic word embedding to a metric embedding in which
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Fig. 4. Triplet LSTM architecture of our DNN used to extract TE from
activity content. Content is converted to a topic embedding via averaging
words within a tweet under a learned semantic (topic) model. Temporal
embedding is learned via LSTM reflecting social media behavior over
time. Initially the LSTM is trained as a classifier to discriminate between
users within a training corpus (under cross entropy loss LC , yielding a
’user’ embedding) The embedding is then fine-tuned to yield the final
TE embedding via triplet training using sequences of real twitter posts
(positives), and simulated fake sequences created by splicing twitter
histories together negatives), under a triplet loss LT .
similar TE samples are pushed together and dissimilar
samples pushed away from each other in the learned space.
Here, similar samples are the temporal segments from one
individual and dissimilar samples are the ones from dif-
ferent individuals. The method proved efficient in identi-
fying different individuals from their temporal features, as
learned by the prior LSTM step. We tested the method to
detect compromised moments of an account, by randomly
selecting a time step on one user’s time-line feed. We then
replaced the Tweets after the time point by the tweets from
another user in order to simulate anomalous accounts, in
order to provide negative exemplars for training.
Fig. 4 illustrates our network architecture and end-to-
end pipeline of our machine learning algorithm for TE
extraction. Given a set of n users U = {u1, u2, · · · , un},
each user has a sequence of k tweets ui = {T1, T2, · · · , Tk}.
The tweets are first pre-processed and projected from vari-
able length text strings to the topic embedding space.
The LSTM then learns a temporal feature of the tweets
for each temporal window, denoted as user embedding,
uei = {twe1, twe2, · · · , twek−w+1}, where w is the window
size. The learning strategy is a classification followed by a
triplet network fine-tuning. We use a single cross-entropy
loss LC for pre-training and the a combined classification
and triplet loss LT based on L2 norm for fine-tuning [61]. In
our experiments we use n = 8000 and k = 800 to train the
TE embedding (c.f. Sec. 7.1).
5 PRIVACY AND INFORMATION SECURITY
In this section we elaborate on the data encryption and key
sharing features of the TAPESTRY platform, the security
properties they require and the security guarantees they
provide for the service. We follow the formalism of timeline
activity proofs (TAP) [20], where we have the user’s trust
evidence as an activity.
5.1 Entities and their roles
Subjects: We model subjects i. e. users on whom data
is collected, using secret-public key pairs (sk, pk), with sk
used generically to contain all secret information required
by the user, i.e. signing keys and seed for derivation of
encryption key. The public key pk is used as public identifier
for the user, referred to in Sec. 3 as the user’s unique ID.
This is analogous to a public Bitcoin wallet address, and we
allow the user to create multiple identities, and thus, hold
multiple key pairs. An assumption of our system is that a
physical identity can not transfer ownership or operation
of such key pairs, so grounding the key pair as a basis for
identity in TAPESTRY.
Public Ledgers with external database: For simplicity, we
consider an idealized version of the blockchain approach
in Section 3, where the public ledger contains an append-
only list and an external database. This allows us to introduce
search functionalities that verifiers require, and offer data
removal to the users that have submitted their activities.
Verifiers and Policies: Verifiers establish policies - state-
ments over different types of activities in specific intervals,
that the users must satisfy. Our construction follows [20], ex-
cept we consider a particular type of policy where a human
verifier makes a binary decision based on the visualizations
of Sec. 6.
5.2 Form of Trust Evidence
A user’s TE maintains a strict format: the user’s public
identity pk (i. e. unique identified), the time it has been
registered time, the type of evidence type with any optional
descriptors [tags], the machine learning encoding (i. e. real-
valued vector) of the evidence data data, and a digital
signature σ to authenticate that it was submitted by user
pk. When the user submits this trust evidence, the data
component is encrypted cdata, therefore:
TE = 〈pk, time, type, cdata, [tags], σ〉 .
Building Blocks: Our construction relies on pseudo-
random functions (PRF) [26] and digital signature (DS) [15] that
are existentially unforgeable under chosen message attacks (EUF-
CMA) [27]. Additionally, we consider a symmetric encryption
scheme (SE) with two security requirements: indistinguisha-
bility under chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) and wrong key
detection (WKD) [8].
Key Management: The trust evidence data is en-
crypted with a symmetric encryption scheme, where the
encryption/decryption keys play an important part of the
policy verification. Our solution is to derive unique encryp-
tion keys for finite time periods and for each kind of activity;
in practice this could be as granualar as a key per piece of
TE. We realize this by assigning a random PRF seed s to each
user, when they join our system. For TE, the encryption key
ek is build as:
ek = PRF(s,PRF(s, pk, time), type).
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For a greater degree of granularity, we may consider count-
ing the same type of trust evidence received at the same
time duration: PRF(s, ek, count). Furthermore, this allows
for a granular disclosure of encryption keys only for the
trust evidence required by verifiers without compromising
the security of the other trust evidence.
5.3 Security Properties
There are two security properties that our system satisfies:
data confidentiality that ensures the privacy of trust evidence
data after the user has submitted it to the external database
associated with the ledger, and authentication policy com-
pliance where verifiers are only convinced by users who
actually satisfy verification policies. Formal definitions are
available in [20].
Data Confidentiality: Intuitively, this property ensures
that no information is revealed concerning the trust evi-
dence data the user is submitting, just by analyzing entries
in the ledger. This property is modeled by using a prob-
abilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary that is required
to distinguish between two private activity encodings by
seeing an entry in the database that corresponds to one of
them. The entries differ only on the data component, while
the public key, the time, type and tags are the same for both
entries. Following the formalism of TAP, we use crypto-
graphic primitives that satisfy the security requirements of
TAP: IND-CPA for the symmetric encryption scheme, and
pseudo-randomness for PRF.
Authenticated Policy Compliance: This property en-
sures that no malicious user can impersonate an honest
user or fake the existence of trust evidence in the database
associated to the ledger, and convince an honest verifier
that they are authorized and satisfy their policy. We model
this using a PPT adversary that can submit entries to the
external database of a public ledger and is successful if he
can convince an honest verifier to accept the evidence, when
one of the two conditions are satisfied: either the adversary
impersonated an honest user, or he provided a successful
proof for a policy he does not satisfy. Following the for-
malism of TAP, we use cryptographic primitives that satisfy
the security requirements of TAP: WKD for the symmetric
encryption scheme, EUF-CMA for the digital signature, and
pseudo-randomness for PRF.
5.4 Implementation details
Our cryptographic primitives are instantiated using the im-
plementation from the python library pynacl. Our PRF is in-
stantiated with the BLAKE2b [57]. In [3], it has been shown
that BLAKE2b satisfies the pseudo-randomness property
required by PRFs. Our DS uses the Ed25519 [5] implemen-
tation from [57] to instantiate the digital signature. Ed25519
offers existential unforgeability under chosen message at-
tacks. Our SE is instantiated with the Salsa20 and Poly1305
MAC [36]. In [56] it has been shown that this construction
satisfies IND-CPA. Moreover, the exact construction uses the
technique from [8], and therefore also satisfies WKD.
6 MAKING TRUST EVIDENCE COMPREHENSIBLE
TAPESTRY aims to visually communicate a gist of the
completeness and coherence of a subject’s TE over time, so
Fig. 5. Initial designs for the TAPESTRY visualisation prototyped with the
focus group. The two designs progressed for evolution and implemen-
tation in the service, based on user feedback, were the ‘slash’ and the
‘pie’ (shown second and fourth from left on the top row). The purpose
of the visualisation is to communicate the completeness of TE records
over the shared time period, and the coherence of activities generating
that TE i. e. to flag anomalous behaviour. In many of the initial designs,
these properties were reflected by spatial coverage and use of colour
respectively.
that a verifier can make an informed choice as to whether
to trust that subject. We rejected the security related motifs
(e.g. ticks, padlocks) that are often used in online systems
to signal the efficacy of a particular security function or do-
main of use; e.g. proportionate red-amber-green traffic light
scales as used for food packaging to indicate nutritional
content [14]; bronze, silver, gold hues often incorporated
into badge, certificate or star rating symbolism. Such tropes
convey trustworthiness as quantifiable and unequivocal (see
[53]). All visualisations are persuasive to an extent [48];
this has serious design implications as TAPESTRY does
not (visually) verify an online actor’s trustworthiness but
aims to support individuals in making their own judgments
about in whom and what to trust.
Key design challenges include integrating technically
and conceptually complex models into human centred ap-
proaches [18], [19], [34], [67], [68], that account for different
perspectives on human understandings, values and experi-
ence [17], [22]. TAPESTRY’s target user group comprises a
particular demographic that is less likely to use an online
service’s security features [32], [54]; and has lower levels
of numeracy (see [48]), than on average. Thus, there are
a multiplicity of interwoven design challenges and ethical
concerns around visually or otherwise communicating TE
and how this is then interpreted and understood, challenges
that are amplified by the non-semantic nature of TE.
6.1 Prototyping of Visualisations
User focus groups and lab-based workshops with user
experience (UX) designers informed early concept designs
for the visualisation. Our design inspirations were broad,
from Knightmare, a 1990s British TV quest gameshow for
children that manifested the health status of the characters
using pixelated computer graphics, to more conventional
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Fig. 6. Developed visualisations deployed in TAPESTRY. Left: Pie communicates interpersonal trust e. g. to help users determine whether to trust
an unknown business or service online. Concentric rings of the pie correspond to different granularities of time, and shading is used to communicate
coherence and volume of activity within the time period corresponding to each segment. Right: Slash communicates introspective trust e. g. to help
users determine if their social media account has been compromised. Each slash corresponds to a period of time, with backslashes indicating
anomolous (outlier) TE during that period. Shading is used to communicate volume of TE during that period, as with ‘pie’. Six instances of the
visualisations are displayed ranging from complete and coherent, to sparse TE over the time period requested by the verifier.
information and data visualisation practices. From this we
then produced 12 initial designs we called ‘snowflake’;
‘slash’; ‘radiance’; ‘pie’; ‘T-bar’ (referring to TAPESTRY);
‘T’; ‘shield’; ‘tiles’; ‘pixel face’; ‘Picasso’; ‘eye’ and ‘pixel
head’ (see Fig. 5). We then rejected designs that could not
depict sufficient granularity of either the completeness or
coherence of TE over time. We also rejected designs that
did not readily scale down (i.e. for viewing on a small
screen) e. g. ‘pixel head’ inspired by Knightmare, the most
anthropomorphic of the designs. We also rejected ‘eye’ as
evocative of a surveillance system. We explored use of
colour and tone, both to enable additional granularity of
visual representation of the shared TE and with regard to
colour’s culturally situated function that could invite poten-
tially unintended meanings for some users. Additionally,
in terms of interpreting completeness of TE – within the
research team it became apparent that the computer scien-
tists associated lighter tone with more TE while designers
interpreted white areas of a design as an absence of TE
within a given time period. With these constraints in mind,
we selected to use the idioms of ‘slash’ and ‘pie’ as the
preliminary visualisations for further development.
6.2 Evolved Visualisation Designs
The final designs for the ‘pie’ and ‘slash’ TE visualisations
are shown in Fig. 6. The choice of two designs for the visu-
alisation reflect two use cases for deployment of TAPESTRY,
evaluated in Sec. 7.
Pie is based on a simple dial that lends itself to represent-
ing temporality and accumulation of DP over days, weeks,
months etc, across concentric circles, as though accumulated
TE is moving towards the core of the pie. This design is
used for the interpersonal trust case in which users are
required to make trust decisions on an a priori unknown
online business or service. We report of the efficacy of the
visualisation in this context within the video games crowd-
funding experiment of Sec. 7.2.
Slash meanwhile was intended to communicate intro-
spective trust, where users can check TE derived from their
own digital footprint (i. e. act as both subject and verifier) to
determine whether their online accounts have been hacked
(Sec. 7.1.). This required a design that could visually detail
sudden dissonance within an otherwise relatively uniform
pattern of DP as generated over time. A visual design
analogy would be a ladder in hosiery or a dropped stitch
in knitwear; these draw the eye, despite their small scale,
to solicit a feeling of unease in the user to invite further
investigation.
Both these visualisations necessitate some initial expla-
nation and guidance [48], though their intended meaning
will require learning only once [12]. This is addressed via
tutorial during the initial user sign-up to the TAPESTRY
service.
7 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We evaluate the TAPESTRY service in two contexts. First,
intraspective trust which we evaluate in the context of
social media account hijacking; a user must determine
whether their social account has been compromised due to
anomalous posting behaviour. Second, interpersonal trust in
which a user must determine the trustworthiness of another
online. We evaluate this in the domain of rewards-based
crowd-funding, where parties are typically unknown to one
another initially and a trust judgment is fundamental to the
decision to invest in a venture.
7.1 Intraspective Trust: Anomaly Detection
We first evaluate the efficacy of our proposed DNN ap-
proach (Sec. 4) for extracting trust evidence from social
activities (text based Twitter posts). We evaluate its ability
to discriminate between the behaviour of different users,
and its ability to detect anomalies within the social media
feed of individual users. The experiments were conducted
using a public dataset of Twitter posts (‘tweets’) gathered
by Li et al. [45] initially comprising 50 million tweets for
140 thousand users. In our experiments, we study social
media footprint over longitudinal time periods and clean
the data by removing users with fewer than 800 tweets in
their timeline feeds. The remaining 8000 users form the basis
for our experiments.
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Fig. 7. Mechanical Turk experiment evaluating the efficacy of the ‘slash’ visualisation for anomaly detection (intraspective trust). MTurk workers were
presented with a series of four visualisations each summarizing four weeks of trust evidence. Based on the series, users were asked which (if any)
of the visualisations appeared anomalous relative to the others and so implied unusual activity was present in the social media feed.
Evaluating Trust Evidence (TE) Embedding
We justify our choice of a LSTM to learn a temporal model
for TE, via comparative evaluation against two state of the
art DNN architectures; RNN and GRU. We evaluate all three
architectures as a user classification problem; the networks
are trained using 80% of the tweets of n = [500, 8000]
users and tested on the remainder. Accuracy is measured
as the number of times the system correctly identifies the
user among the n possibilities. Fig. 8 shows the result of
classification accuracy on all the three models as n increase.
The LSTM model outperforms the other two models in most
of cases.
Evaluating Anomaly Detection
We compare the efficacy of our learned embedding at detect-
ing anomalies within a single user’s history of TE. For this
experiment we train the model on 80% of users, and testing
on the remaining 20%. We compare several approaches to
detecting anomalies within the test partition:
1) One-class SVM (OCSVM) [60] computes a non-
linear boundary in a higher dimension space using
kernel method for data project. This method allows
for only positive data as ’one class’.
2) Isolation Forest (IF) [46] evaluates the isolation
degree of each data point using a random forest.
This algorithm focuses on separating the outliers
from the data points.
3) Local outliers factor (LOF) [7] is a distance-based
method using Euclidean distance considering the
density of neighborhood information.
4) Proposed method. We applied a distance based
method outlier detection on our proposed user em-
bedding. We evaluate Euclidean distance between
the point and the average user embedding of first
fraction of user’s activity, represented as user be-
Precision Recall F1-score
fh 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3
OCSVM 0.43 0.46 0.48 0.44 0.46 0.48 0.43 0.46 0.47
IF 0.71 0.62 0.57 0.75 0.64 0.59 0.73 0.63 0.58
LOF 0.12 0.24 0.34 0.13 0.25 0.37 0.12 0.24 0.35
Ours 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.98 0.91 0.92 0.95 0.91 0.94
TABLE 1
Evaluating the ability of our embedding to perform anomaly detection.
Results compare our proposed approach to anomaly detection within
the learned embedding to two common baselines.
havior norm. We consider distance larger than a
selected threshold as outliers.
We simulate hijacking actions on users’ Twitter stream to
evaluate anomaly detection. Given a fraction (fh) hijacking
length, we randomly replace fraction of tweets in each user’s
feed by another user’s content. These replacements are
unusual behaviors that deviate from user’s activity norm.
In Table 1, we show the result of precision and recall. Our
proposed method outperforms all the other methods and
invariant to the number of fraction number of hijacking
length.
Comprehensibility of the visualisation
In order to evaluate if our proposed visualisation is un-
derstandable and helpful for non-expert users to detect
potential anomalies, we crowd-source evaluation on the
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) platform. Fig. 7 depicts
a representative questionnaire. We provide four successive
visualisations of of a user’s activities sampled at regular
intervals across their TE history. Each visualisation contains
four weeks of activities. Normal behaviors are represented
by forward slashes while the backward slashes as unusual
behaviors detected by our proposed method in Section 4. A
blank position means no activities in that time-stamps. The
MTurk worker is asked to select one if they think there exists
unusual behaviors among the set of four visualisations i. e.
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Fig. 8. Evaluating user discrimination without our DNN learned embed-
ding for trust evidence. Our temporal modelling approach (based on
LSTM) is compared to RNN and GRU sequence models. The experi-
ment is run for n = [500, 8000] corpus of users and accuracy measured
as the % of users correctly identified based on 20% of their TE.
deviation from the norm. In the experiment, we collect 1000
users in our dataset and keep users who have over 4 weeks
activities in their timeline, results 537 tasks. Each task is
assigned to 5 different workers. A task is correctly detected
if most of workers make the correct decision. As a result, 16
workers are attributed to the whole tasks and 93.8% tasks
were correctly selected by the workers. On average, each
worker spend around 1 minute to finish a task including
reading the instructions and submitting their decisions.
7.2 Interpersonal Trust: Crowdfunding
We evaluate the performance of TAPESTRY in terms of
benefit to the human decision making process when estab-
lishing the trustworthiness of an individual online.
Mock Crowd-funding Campaign
We designed an interpersonal user study comprising a
decision-making task experiment presented as a mock
crowdfunding campaign in the context of the video games
start-up; a sector heavily reliant upon such funding. In this
context, a user (the ’verifier’) is invited to make an invest-
ment by another user (the ’subject’) without prior knowl-
edge of that subject. Our game was offered for investment
by eight crowdfunders on a mock platform; four real games
industry professionals and four fake identities that had been
created two months prior to the study. We commissioned an
experienced video game narrative writer who mocked-up
a pitch for new video game and crowdfunding campaign.
We had gained the consent of the games developers to use
their real profiles in the campaign. Meanwhile the writer
produced four fake profiles based on their knowledge of
the gaming industry. We created fake Twitter accounts for
the fake profiles and continually tweeted relevant game and
entrepreneur-related comments for two months prior to the
study. All eight crowdfunders had one campaign web page
hosted on a password protected micro-site, which included
a description of the game (constant across all candidates), a
Fig. 9. Visualisation of two crowdfunders’ digital footprints: strong prove-
nance (left) and limited provenance (right). The TE requested by the
’verifier’ (participant) was fixed to 2 months with concentric circles rep-
resent daily tweet activity (inner) to weeks of activity (outer).
short biography for each profile and a link to their Twitter
account. The creation date of the real and fake Twitter
accounts was obfuscated.
Experimental setting
The study was run in a closed workshop with 10 partic-
ipants recruited from the University campus population.
After a briefing on the TAPESTRY service, participants
were invited to read the crowdfunding campaigns, browse
the background description and biographies and invest a
hypothetical $1000 ‘TAPESTRY currency’ between the eight
campaigns. We randomly split the participant group into
two; only one group was provided with TAPESTRY visuali-
sations on the mock crowd-funding site (Fig. 9). Participants
could use the mock site or wider resources on the Internet to
help them make decisions to allocate the money. The study
lasted 35 minutes; participants were asked to make one
decision every 5 minutes given the knowledge they gleaned
from their full use of Internet resources.
Experiment results
We evaluated the participants’ performance based on their
investment results, comparing the amounts invested in real
and fake profiles for both groups. We consider investment in
a fake profile (i. e. scammer) a bad investment. Fig. 10 shows
that the accuracy of the investment results correlates to the
time taken in background research; the more participants
gathered information from their searches on the Internet, the
more accurately they made their investment. Given the time
limit, the TAPESTRY group used the visualisation tool to
quickly understand the games developers’ Twitter identity,
speeding up their search to establish legitimacy. We can
conclude that although participants reached similar, correct
decisions (in terms of discriminating their investment be-
tween genuine and fake developers) the time-to-task was
considerable shorter (approx. by half) for TAPESTRY users.
8 CONCLUSION
We presented TAPESTRY; a novel Blockchain based service
that enables users to determine the provenance of online
identity from their digital personhood (DP) in order to
make better decisions on who to trust online. We applied
the TAPESTRY service to two tasks; determining the trust-
worthiness of another unknown individual (interpersonal
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Fig. 10. Participants’ investment performance in the mock crowd-funding experiment: top row is the control group without TAPESTRY visualisation;
bottom row with TAPESTRY. The users with access to TAPESTRY achieved similar or better accuracy in detecting fake profiles, but did so at least
twice as quickly.
trust), and determining the integrity of one’s own social
media feed (intraspective trust). We used machine learn-
ing techniques to extract trust evidence from social media
activities in a privacy preserving manner, and a proof-of-
work Blockchain to store hashes of that evidence in order
to underwrite its provenance. Our service enabled users
to then selectively disclose trust evidence to one another
in order to prove the provenance of their identity. To
improve comprehension of the high volumes of evidence
shared between users, we designed visualization techniques
to summarise that evidence. We evaluated the end-to-end
system using a mocked up crowd-funding exercise run in a
user workshop, and showed that TAPESTRY enables people
to make accurate trust decision faster than the control group
without access to the service. We evaluated the end-to-end
system for anomaly detection and showed that TAPESTRY
enabled users to detect anomalies in a social media feed
with accuracy of ∼ 94%.
Currently TAPESTRY is a prototype and future work will
explore at-scale deployment beyond workshop settings. At
scale it will become necessary to run multiple data lake ser-
vices, with users distributed across different lakes. This will
add value to the PoW Blockchain which will then be main-
tained across multiple lakes. At this stage further charac-
terization of the performance of the TAPESTRY Blockchain
should be undertaken. Nevertheless we do not believe at-
scale deployment of TAPESTRY is necessary to demonstrate
the value in our hybrid on- and off-chain architecture for
identity provenance, and the novel machine learning and
visualization techniques developed for the service.
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